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The Perry Centennial of 1953 in Okinawa:  





This paper examines the significance of the Perry Centennial festival of 1953, the 100-year 
anniversary of the United States’ opening Okinawa of 1853. The U.S. government regarded the 
Centennial as an excellent opportunity to promote American democracy in Postwar Okinawa, 
particularly at the moment when Soviet pressure in Asia increased.  In order to prevent Communist 
aggression and gain Okinawan people’s understanding on U.S. policy in East Asia, the U.S. used the 
Perry Centennial to emphasize the mutual unity and security with Okinawa. The U.S. military 
government in Okinawa sought to present the drama of Commodore Matthew C. Perry’s diplomacy 
and the success of his historic naval expedition to underscore the world leadership of the United States 
in 1953. The article examines such America’s cultural diplomacy toward Okinawa, and describes how 
the Perry Centennial of 1953 helped shape the public opinion on U.S. policy in Cold War in Okinawa. 
 





In John Patrick’s screen play of Vern Schneider’s novel (1954), Tea House of the August 
Moon, Colonel Wainright Purdy III declares, “My job is to teach these natives [Okinawans] 
the meaning of democracy, and they’re going to learn democracy if I have to shoot everyone 
of them.” Captain Fisby’s first order of business as the military governor in the village of 
Tobiki was to deliver an address to the Okinawan people, explaining the meaning of 
democracy to them. Everyone cheered after his speech. The captain was delighted until his 
interpreter, Sakini, explained that during 800 years of foreign occupation, the Okinawans had 
learned to cheer whoever was in charge, no matter what was said.  
Colonel Purdy and Captain Fisby were to convert the Okinawans to the “American way 
of life.” The American way consisted of organizing a Women’s League for Democratic 
Action, establishing an education program, and setting up a local industry, like bicycle 
manufacturer. Nonetheless, eventually both Colonel Purdy and Captain Fisby ended up being 
converted to the Okinawan way of life. The Okinawan method of living consisted of 
converting American clothing into fancy kimono pajamas, holding sumo wrestling matches, 
accomplishing industrialization through the construction of a sweet potato distillery, and 
finally, building up a pentagon-shaped teahouse for geisha.  
Captain Fisby was so impressed with the idea that he gradually immersed himself in 
Okinawan way of life. Attending official meetings in kimono and experiencing romance with 
geisha, he came to realize that, in the long run, one could not tell which was the conqueror 
and which the conquered. While the military Occupation of Japan under MacArthur was 
successful, the U.S. military Occupation of Okinawa was portrayed in the play as poorly 
planned and executed. 
In its long history of military conquest, Okinawans had acquired their own wisdom on 
how to protect their own interest under foreign occupation. The portrait of Okinawans in 
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Teahouse of the August Moon is very interesting and persuasive. The play became a 
sensational hit in NY Broadway in 1953 that the U.S. military in Okinawa planned to release 
it in Okinawa in 1954 on the occasion of the Perry Centennial event with Okinawan and 
American casting. Yet, when the play was going to open after several times rehearsals, one 
local Okinawan who was assigned to play the role of an old man withdrew his participation 
with the reason that the content of the story was insulting to Okinawans. Despite U.S. 
military’s effort to replace his role with Filipino actor, eventually they were not able to 
release the play against the opposition of Okinawans (Miyagi, 1992).  
This incident reflects the tensions between Americans and Okinawans in 1954 when U.S. 
President Dwight Eisenhower declared America’s infinite possession of Okinawa, and the 
U.S military government imposed anti-communist purge of potential leftists in Okinawa. 
Then, the U.S. military deprived Okinawans of their land property for low rent. Under such 
circumstances, Okinawans refused to accept America’s proposal to put on play together. 
Today after four decades of the return of the island to Japan, history of the U.S. occupation is 
becoming a thing of the past among Okinawans.  Nonetheless, introduction of American 
culture has greatly impacted Okinawans’ life. This paper examines the interactions between 
Okinawans and Americans, and the formation of their mutual images through U.S. cultural 
policy toward Okinawans from the late 1940s until 1953-1954, at the occasion of the Perry 
Centennial event.  
By April 1945, Allied attack was ready to converge on the island of Okinawa, the 
strategic gateway to the Japanese heartland, and for the first time, Okinawans and Americans 
faced each other in actual combat by June. Yet, long before the U.S. military landed in 
Okinawa, American soldiers had been given some information about the island through 
orientations and brochures distributed by the army. Based on these sources, each individual 
American soldier shared a common image of Okinawa as an island of full of venomous 
snakes and communicable diseases. Meanwhile, Okinawans also had their own preconceived 
perceptions of Americans. They were told that if they were captured, women would be raped 
and men and children would be murdered. Believing these rumors, thousands of Okinawan 
civilians committed group suicide to avoid being captured.  
Above all, Civil Affairs Handbook published by the U.S. military government greatly 
influenced American opinion on Okinawa. The document talks about history of Okinawa, its 
politics, economy, society, industry, education, and even racial tensions between Okinawans 
and Japanese. It states that despite similarities in language and racial origin, Japanese did not 
regard Okinawans as equal. Rather, they considered Okinawans somewhat like poverty-
stricken cousins from countryside. Okinawans, on their part, did not feel inferior to Japanese 
as they were very proud of their relations with China and China’s influence on its cultural 
tradition. The document concluded that it would be possible to use those potential conflicts 
between Japanese and Okinawans for America’s political purpose. It also states that 
Okinawans were not as hostile toward Americans as the militaristic Japanese were and that 
this was probably due to the fact that many Okinawans were exposed to the “real America” 
through their experience of immigration to Hawaii. Thus, they would not believe Japanese 
propaganda.  
By stressing Okinawan’s unique ethnic identity, the U.S. military expected Okinawans to 
become their agent or collaborator in their mission of building democracy in Postwar Asia. 
When the island was placed under U.S. military control in 1945-1971, however, the U.S. 
military struggled to explain and justify their presence to the local people. Still, until the late 
1940s, the U.S. military government did not launch any major cultural propaganda campaign 




for the purpose of gaining Okinawans’ support for U.S. policy and American idealism.  
U.S. cultural propaganda efforts in Okinawa can be divided into three stages. First during 
the early 1950s, the U.S. military was confident that they could receive Okinawans’ support 
for American democracy and its idealism in the free world. They never thought of promoting 
Okinawa as the keystone of the Pacific and a showcase of democracy to be contradictory. 
Therefore, those two messages were meshed into one and jointly advertised.  
No matter how obedient Okinawans were to the victors, however, if they were deprived 
of their land for the U.S. military base, they would not continue to be the followers of 
Americanism. Toward the mid-1950s, Okinawans started protesting against U.S. policies. 
This was the second stage of the U.S. cultural campaign in Okinawa. Finally, the issue of 
land property ballooned into an island-wide conflict. When the Socialist leader Senaga 
Kamejiro ran for the mayor of Naha city, the U.S. military decided to strip Senaga his 
eligibility for elected office in 1954 based on fears that Senaga would fuel anti-colonialism 
and anti-military base protest among Okinawans. By 1960, the U.S. shifted their cultural 
propaganda campaign focus from anti-communism or protection of democracy to the 
emphasis on an understanding of Ryukyu culture or America’s support for restoration of 
Ryukyuan identity. This is the third stage of the campaign (Miyagi, 1992). 
Among many studies on Postwar Okinawa, Postwar Okinawa and America, edited by 
Teruya Yoshihiko and Yamazato Katsumi is one of the few researches on postwar Okinawa 
that take on a social and cultural historical point of view. It includes collection of essays on 
food, journalism, education, literature, architecture and even public opinion. The book 
introduces enormous data and primary sources focusing on the cultural interaction between 
the U.S. and Okinawa. Former journalist and native Okinawan scholar Miyagi Etsujiro 
further examines the power balance between American and Okinawans in terms of cultural 
and military invasion of the island. In his representative work, Senryosha no Me 
(Conqueror’s eyes) Miyagi illustrates Okinawan’s struggle and resistance to accept 
conqueror’s system and culture. He concluded that what happened was, rather than a 
sweeping Americanization of Okinawa, that Okinawans selectively adopted the American 
system in order to adjust to the local society.  Similar to Miyagi’s approach, in Fukeino 
Sakeme (Breakdown of Landscape) Tanaka Yasuhiro (2012) demonstrates how cultural 
colonization took place through establishment of the University of Ryukyu and American 
controlled mass media, then how Okinawan identity was reborn in popular culture and 
politics during the sixty years of postwar period. This paper adds another aspect of American 
cultural policy toward Okinawans on the specific occasion of the Perry Centennial of 1953 to 
analyze Okinawans’ response to U.S. military government’s cultural propaganda campaign 
in addition to the history of America’s cultural policy in postwar Okinawa.  
 
 
2. BACKGROUND ON OKINAWA 
 
The strategic importance of the Ryukyu Islands and Okinawa had been recognized by 
both Japanese and American policy-makers since at least the time of Commodore Matthew 
Perry’s expedition. Until 1879, the Ryukyu Kingdom was an independent kingdom, called 
Shurei no kuni, “the country of courtesy.” Long time before Japan annexed it, the Ryukyus 
had many contact with other Asian countries as well as Western nations. As early as the 7th 
century, the Chinese sent their envoys to Ryukyu king. During the 14th century, Ryukyus 
became one of Ming China’s tributary states. Annual tribute was paid to China until 1875, 
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but the Chinese did not interfere in the internal affairs of the islands as long as Ryukyu kings 
continued their tributes. Until the 14th century, the Japanese influence upon the islands was 
relatively smaller compared that of the Chinese. Nonetheless, as Japanese samurai warriors 
sought to expand their domains by the mid-15th century, the king of the Ryukyus was forced 
to pay annual tribute to the Japanese as well as the Chinese. The Ryukyuans simultaneously 
acknowledged two masters in Asia and somehow managed to maintain a stable monarchy 
until the early 17th century. 
In 1609, the Satsuma domain, the Japanese feudal domain, conquered all the Ryukyu 
Islands including Okinawa. Thereafter, the Ryukyu Islands came under the political 
supervision of the Shimazu house of Satsuma domain although they were allowed to retain 
their autonomy. At the same time, the Ryukyus continued to be a tributary state of China. 
Then, Commodore Matthew C. Perry arrived in Japan in 1853 and he showed great interest 
in the Ryukyu Islands. He considered the possible consequences of American expansion in 
East Asia in the 19th century. Perry’s visit to Ryukyu palace caused dismay and 
apprehension among the Ryukyuans. Perry took great pains to figure out the political status 
of the islands during his expeditions to Japan in 1853-1854. He was not sure if the Ryukyu 
Islands belonged to China or Japan, or if it was an independent kingdom. Nonetheless, his 
enthusiasm failed to arouse favorable response from the higher officials in Washington. Once 
the U.S. successfully opened up Tokugawa Japan, their interest in Ryukyu Islands 
diminished (Watanabe, 1970:6). 
Shortly after the Meiji Restoration in 1868, the Japanese set out to incorporate the 
Ryukyus as an integral part of the nation. In 1874 an opportunity arose for formal Japanese 
annexation when large groups of Ryukyu fishermen were shipwrecked on Formosa and 
killed by Formosan aborigines. This incident gave Japan an opportunity to send a punitive 
expedition to Formosa. Acting as a protector, Japan seized the Ryukyu Islands. An 
agreement was signed between China and Japan. China recognized Japan’s sovereignty in 
the Ryukyus, referring to the Ryukyu inhabitants as “subjects of Japan” in 1879. Thus the 
Ryukyus became the Okinawa Prefecture whose governor was appointed by the central 
government in Tokyo.  
When the war in the Pacific ended in 1945, Okinawa was placed under the sole control of 
the U.S. whereas the rest of Japan was under the control of Allied powers. This meant that 
Okinawa was controlled directly and exclusively by the American military government while 
in the mainland Japan, the U.S. was responsible to the Allied machinery of Japanese 
Occupation such as the Far Eastern Commission. Under direct surveillance, any kind of 




3. FORMATION OF THE U.S MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN OKINAWA AND 
CULTURAL RECONSTRUCTION 
 
The War in the Pacific ended on 15 August 1945 and signified the beginning of the 
American occupation in Okinawa. The U.S. military government established the 
“Administration of the Ryukyu Islands.” Its primary goal was civilian relief and 
rehabilitation. In postwar Japan, while Douglas MacArthur served as chief policy enforcer at 
his SCAP headquarters in Tokyo, his association with field personnel in Okinawa remained 
distant. In Okinawa, William E. Crist commanded the Civil Affairs Teams. As early as April 




1946, the Central Okinawan Administration was established, and in August of that year, the 
military government initiated the establishment of the Okinawan Advisory Council. In 
December 1950, the military government of the Ryukyu Islands became the United States 
Civil Administration in the Ryukyus (USCAR). The Ryukyu Islands at a Glance, a pamphlet 
published by the U.S. military government, stated the objectives of the USCAR clearly. The 
primary mission of the United States Forces was the prevention of disease and unrest in the 
land that had been devastated. The second objective was economic recovery up to the prewar 
level. The third objective was to bring democracy to the islands. The U.S. side had expected 
that those objectives could be easily achieved under the leadership of American military 
government as they viewed Okinawans as incapable of governing by themselves and more 
“primitive” than Japanese on the mainland. Many American cartoons describing Okinawan 
farmers, fishermen, and civilians showed how backwards they were in terms of technology 
and modern political systems (USCAR, 1954:1-40). 
The depiction of Okinawans as less sophisticated than the Japanese on the mainland was 
common. The Civil Affairs Handbook (1944), which was compiled by the U.S Army Service 
Forces points out the strong tensions between Okinawans and Japanese. The booklet shows 
the fact that the Japanese did not regard Okinawans as equal, and they had a strong racial 
prejudice. Because of these conflicts, it stated that there was no enthusiastic patriotism 
toward Japan among Okinawans. Then, as a conclusion, the handbook suggested that it 
would be a wise idea to use these tensions between the Okinawans and the Japanese in order 
to promote U.S. political agenda. They continuously described the differences between the 
Japanese and the Okinawans in terms of personality, culture, lifestyle, education, language, 
and racial identity. For example: 
 
In comparison with the Japanese, the Ryukyu natives are reported to be somewhat shorter, 
stockier, and darker, and to be characterized by more prominent nose, higher foreheads, and less 
noticeable cheekbones. Their hair is more often wavy . . . . Despite the close ethnic relationship 
between Japanese and Ryukyu islanders, their linguistic kinship, the people of the archipelago are 
not regarded by the Japanese as their racial equals. They [are] looked upon, as it were, as poor 
cousins from the country, with peculiar rustic ways of their own, and are consequently 
discriminated against in various ways. The islanders on the other hand, have no sense of inferiority 
but rather take pride in their own traditions and in their longstanding cultural ties with China. 
Inherent in the relations between the Ryukyu people and the Japanese, therefore, are potential seeds 
of dissension out of which political capital might be made. It is almost certain that militarism and 
fanatical patriotism have been but slightly developed (Office of the Chief Operations Naval 
Department 1944:43). 
 
While the economic aid packages that were over US $164.5 million were provided to 
boost Okinawan economy through the Government and Relief in Occupied Areas (GARIOA) 
Fund, the cultural reconstruction of postwar Okinawa started in November 1948 by the 
Department of Civil Information and Education (CI&E). Its first purpose was the 
reconstruction of cultural facilities such as libraries, theaters, radio broadcasting stations, and 
newspaper companies, which were destroyed during the war. A second aim was the 
promotion of democratic concepts and engendering Okinawan support for U.S. policies and 
programs through cultural orientation programs. For those purposes, the CI&E Department 
of the USCAR set up six information centers in the Ryukyus island chains. The three on 
Okinawa were located at Nago, Ishikawa, and Naha cities. In other part of the Ryukyu 
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Islands, the Amami Oshima Center was located at Naze; the Miyako Center was in Hirara, 
and the Yaeyama Center was in Ishigaki. The purpose of those centers was not only to 
supply information regarding the U.S., but also to establish a friendly attitude toward 
America among Ryukyuans. Among the events held at these centers, English classes were 
popular. Exhibitions and movies were also welcomed. Commonly stressed subjects were 
those concerning the people about America, the American way of life, the meaning of 
democracy, home and farm improvement, health, sanitation, and public safety.  
Numerous meetings were frequently held in order to acquaint the Okinawans with the 
U.S. military government and its system. The demonstrations and exhibits were used as well 
as supplemental lectures, roundtable discussions, and motion pictures for their cultural 
orientation programs during late 1940s and early 1950s. One of the good examples was 
CI&E’s posters and pamphlet distribution campaigns. During the first half of 1949, the CI&E 
Department began to print numerous posters. For example, one of the early posters was 
entitled “A Bridge to Democracy,” and bore labels and a caption stating that the bridge from 
a Ryukyu under militarism to a democratic Ryukyu must be supported by pillars labeled 
freedom of thought, and respect for human rights. Nine thousand posters were produced 
during May 1949 (Tull, 1953). In support of “Ryukyuan-American Education Week,” during 
4-10 December 1949, 390,000 leaflets were distributed to Okinawan students. The five 
subjects to be studied included “Democracy in the Home,” “Democracy in the School,” 
“Foundations of Good Government,” “Rights of the Citizen in a Democracy,” and 
“Responsibilities of the Citizens in a Democracy.” Students were requested to take the 
leaflets home to their parents and to post them in their homes (Tull, 1953).  
A total of 202,500 leaflets were dropped in seventeen flights over Okinawa, Miyako, 
Yaeyama, and Amami prefectures. Another 100,000 leaflets were distributed by sound truck 
crews, and local distributors. As indicated by their titles, these leaflets were further 
indoctrination along democratic lines and also primers for the administration of a democratic 
government including for example: “The Rights of a Citizen in a Democracy,” “ the Right 
Man for the Right Job,” and “The Foundation of Democratic Government” (Trafton, 1992: 
111). 
The CI&E used films as well. 16-mm documentaries and news films with a Japanese 
sound track were broadcast, including Ryukyuan Legal Chiefs Visit the U.S., Corporal 
Cornel and Mrs. Cornel’s Welcome to America, Ryukyuan Government Leaders Visit 
Maryland, Ryukyuan Exchange Students, and Police Mission in the U.S. The U.S. military 
government estimated that 20,000 persons watched CI&E films each week. The films with a 
Japanese language track were loaned through the CI&E Central Motion Picture Distribution 
Unit to the local cultural centers, health centers, native labor training sections, commercial 
theaters, amusement parks, agricultural cooperatives, branches of the Education Department, 
youth clubs, and the University of Ryukyus.  Cultural Centers, in turn, showed films through 
the use of mobile units to remote villages and prisons (USCAR, 1952:199-201).  
The CI&E and the USCAR also held exhibitions.  During 1952, the Exhibit Unit of the 
CI&E prepared mounted-picture displays, various types of posters, and several political 
pamphlets and booklets about the United States. A series of approximately fifty-three such 
exhibits were held during 1952 on a wide variety of subjects, including American media, 
agricultural, and sports, and special holidays in the United States. These exhibits were 
selected to support the CI&E policy: “To operate maximum sympathy and understanding for 
the United States, its culture, and its aims” (USCAR, 1952:204-205). Generally any 
exhibition campaign was not as effective as film. It attracted fewer participants, many of the 




panels failed to have self-explanatory approach to the less educated Okinawans.   
 
 
4. THE PERRY CENTENNIAL IN OKINAWA 
 
Among those cultural events initiated by the U.S. military government in Okinawa, the 
Perry Centennial of 1953 attracted more participants than any other campaigns. The 
Centennial was celebrated in Okinawa (the largest island in the Ryukyu island chain) and 
other parts of the Ryukyu as well as mainland Japan.  
The beginning of the Ryukyu (Okinawa)-American relation marked on 26 May, 1853 
when Commodore Matthew C. Perry and his men sailed in Naha Harbor to establish a 
coaling station and to open trade with the Ryukyuans. In fact, before Perry appealed to Japan 
under Tokugawa Shogunate to open trade relations with the U.S., he had made the Ryukyus 
his base when he negotiated with Shogunate government in Edo. The people in Ryukyu had 
been awakened from their long silence by Perry’s sudden arrival two month earlier than 
mainland Japanese, and similarly, the talk between Rykyuan leaders and Perry paved away 
for the conclusion of a treaty over trade between Ryukyu kingdom and the U.S. (Oyadomari, 
1967).   
One hundred years after, in 1953 USCAR and CI&E, and U.S military Government in 
Ryukyu together with Ryukyuan leaders designed the Perry Centennial, the one hundred 
years anniversary of Perry’s arrival in Ryukyu, with the purpose of enhancing mutual 
friendship and understanding between Americans and Ryukyuans. They organized various 
cultural events including art exhibitions at American cultural centers, essay contests, sports 
games, firework shows, and masquerade parade during the Ryukyuan-American Friendship 
Week, 20-26 May, 1953. It became the largest Ryukyuan-American festival ever held in 
Ryukyu. Unlike the case of the Perry Centennial in mainland Japan, which had more 
cooperation from Japanese non-governmental organizations, in Ryukyu where U.S. military 
bases continued to dominate, USCAR, CI&E and U.S. military government took the 
leadership of organizing most of the events.  
 
 
5. PLANNING THE EVENTS 
 
The news report from CI&E, clearly stated their expectation from designing the Perry 
Centennial. CI&E considered the Perry Centennial as the good opportunity to measure the 
effectiveness of cultural propaganda. Secondly, if they gain the support from Ryukyuans, the 
U.S. military government could promote American’s friendship and bring Ryukyuans’ 
awareness on America’s effort to improve Ryukyuan economy and its security (Press and 
Publication CI&E and USCAR, 1953a). Thus, the Commemorative Festival Committee was 
established under the direction of gen. Earl Diffenderfer, and it programmed various athletic 
and cultural events throughout the Ryukyus.  
With the purpose of promoting Perry Centennial event, the post office at Naha issued 
special Perry Centennial stamps, designed by two Ryukuan artists. The six yen stamp was 
designed by Yamada Shinsan, famous Okinawan artist. Old stone fortifications, native 
vessels, and the landing party approaching the pier are shown in the foreground. The four 
American ships are anchored in the background. Commodore Perry’s picture, a replica of his 
portrait in the Annapolis Naval Academy, dominates the scene from the upper portion of the 
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marble blue color stamp. The purple color three yen stamp was designed by Adaniya Seihi, 
another Okinwan artist. It depicts the reception given Commodore Perry and his staff at 
Shuri castle by the Okinawan ruler (Press and Publication CI&E and USCAR, 1953a). 
Uniquely in Ryukyu’s Perry Centennial, A number of athletic competitions were held at 
the same time. More than twenty thousand American and Ryukuan spectators gathered at 
Naha and Shuri to enjoy swimming, tennis, volleyball and baseball matches. Daily Okinawa 
Press reported that the Naha high school baseball team defeated the American team by a 
score of six to three. On 24 May, the second day of the Ryukuan-American Friendship 
Athletic Festival, track and field events along with a ping pong tournament were held at the 
Naha high school grounds (Daily Okinawan Press, 1953, 24 May).  
The Perry Centennial event was highlighted with the two-mile long parade started from 
Asahi bridge near the legislative building in Naha in the afternoon of 24 May. About 60,000 
people of Naha, many American soldiers and officers participated. The parade was headed 
by American military and civil administrators in Ryukyu, including Maj. Gen. David Ogden, 
Deputy Governor and Chief Executive, Higa Shuhei of Government of Ryukyus (GRI), 
General James M. Lewis, Mayor Matayoshi Kowa of Naha City, and President Ikehata 
Mineri of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry. They were followed by the U.S. army 
band and a long line of primary and junior high school students with flag of Rising Sun, and 
Stars and Stripes in their hands. A G.I. disguised as Perry and some Okinawan disguised as 
Ryukyuan regents, others dressed as Sanshikan (governmental ministers) attracted the most 
attention of the 100,000 spectators. Furthermore, in commemoration of Perry Centennial 
Celebration, amnesty was granted to sixty Ryukyuan prisoners by U.S. military (Daily 
Okinawan Press, 1953, 25 May).  
As a part of the Centennial events, the Perry Centennial Hall was constructed at Shuri 
Museum. On 26 May, 1953, the last day of the Ryukyuan-American friendship week, the 
dedication ceremony of the hall was held, attended by a large crowd of U.S. military and 
Ryukyuan officials and citizens. During the ceremony, a number of rare Rykyuan historical 
treasures including twenty-two volumes of Omoro-soshi, a rare gilded headpiece and hair pin 
dated to the Ryukyuan dynasty, sixty ancestral tablets, twenty-six volumes describing the 
former history of the Ryukyuan islands, other precious Ryukyuan treasures were returned to 
the Ryukyuan people from the U.S., and placed in the Shuri museum.  David Ogden, Deputy 
Governor spoke of the long and honorable tradition and history of Ryukyu and the heritage 
of the U.S. at the dedication ceremony. He said that “the United States had no intention of 
depriving the Ryukyuan people of what was theirs” (Press and Publication CI&E and 
USCAR, 1953b).  
In the opening ceremony of Perry Centennial Hall, Yamaguchi Yuriko, a third year 
student of Miyako Girl’s senior high school, read her essay on “Perry Centennial 
Celebration,” which was selected by a committee of Ryukyuans and Americans as the 
winner of the essay contest on “How Can We Best Cultivate Ryukyuan – American 
Friendship?” She received a four-year scholarship to the University of Ryukyu. General 
Ogden also forwarded a letter of appreciation to another young Okinawan hero, Toguchi 
Seiko of Motobu Cho who rescued an American pilot in distress during the Okinawan battle. 
A certificate was awarded to Toguchi for his heroic act of swimming against adverse tides in 
a rough sea to save an American pilot. H. Earl Diffenderfer, chairman of the Perry 
Centennial Committee, said  that  Yamaguchi’s essay and Toguchi’s heroism embodied the 
objective of Ryukuan-American Friendship Week and the Perry Centennial that were the 
promotion of mutual understanding and respect between Ryukyuans and Americans. 




Moreover, Diffenderfer emphasized the respect Americans had for the traditions, customs, 
and culture of the Ryukyuan people. He said that it was Americans’ sincere hope that Perry 
Centennial Hall, the new museum wing, would stand as a tangible symbol of U.S.-Ryukyuan 
friendship. Following Diffenderfer’s speech, Chief Executive Higa Shuhei promised that 
Ryukyuans would share the responsibilities with Free Nations against Communism. He 
emphasized the necessity to cooperate with Americans for the peace of the world (Press and 
Publication CI&E and USCAR, 1953c).  
Many congratulatory messages were sent from Washington D.C. including the one from 
John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State, Admiral W. M. Fechteler, Chief of Naval Operations, 
Robert T. Stevens, Secretary of the Army, and Harry S. Truman, former President. For 
example, Dulles wrote in his message that “the one hundred years which have elapsed since 
Commodore Perry first visited Ryukyu shores have marked the awakening of the world in 
which all men must live as neighbors. He hoped that the respect and understanding between 
the peoples of the Ryukyus and the United States which this celebration epitomizes continue 
to flourish to the mutual benefit and to strengthen the cause of peace of the world” (Daily 
Okinawa Summary, 1953). At Naha Air Base the U.S. military government organized the 
tour of their base for Ryukyuan guests on 26 May to commemorate the Perry Centennial. 
The tour program included the exhibition of free movie, fire-fighting demonstration and 
display of helicopter and airplane (Press and Publication CI&E and USCAR, 1953d). 
 
 
6. OKINAWAN OPINION ON THE EVENTS 
 
Thus, the Perry Centennial of 1953 was designed to promote mutual understanding 
between Americans and Ryukyuans, and at the same time to decrease Ryukyuan’s hatred 
toward Americans. The U.S. military government and USCAR expected that by cheering up 
Okinawan swimmer who won the first prize over American G.Is, by mocking at American 
player who missed a ball in baseball games, the Ryukyuans would forget the fact that they 
were the conquered people who lived in the conquered land. The USCAR hoped that the 
people in Ryukyu were unconsciously immersed into joyful cultural events in a village scale, 
designed by American military government. The Perry Centennial of 1953 in Ryukyu, 
however, brought about the mixed result among Ryukyuan intellectuals. The Okinawa Asahi 
Shimbun reporter asked Ryukyuan leaders of political parties and other organizations the 
following two questions concerning Ryukyuan-American friendship:  
 
1. What should you do to promote Ryukyuan-American friendship? 
2. What is hindering Ryukyuan-American friendship?  
 
Taira Tastuo, Chairman of the Socialist Masses party answered that Ryukyuan-American 
friendship would not bear fruit unless the mutual understanding and confidence are deepened 
in connection with the following problems. Firstly, the problem of reversion to Japan, 
secondly, military–requisitioned land problem, thirdly, the problem concerning the treatment 
of Ryukyuan military employees. Similarly, Araki Seiei, president of the Okinawan 
Federation of Fishery Association pointed out that without solving rationally the problems of 
wages of military employees and problems concerning military–requisitioned land, there 
would be no other way to promote Ryukyuan-American friendship. He also requested the 
military authorities to understand Ryukyuan’s desire for the reversion to Japan.  
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Shinzato Seitoku, chief of the Administrative Office of the Okinawan Teacher’s 
Association stated that in the tiny islands of Ryukyu two different types of people with 
different cultural background live. One is the conqueror, other was the conquered people. 
Shinzato harshly criticized American soldier’s violence and vicious acts in the islands. 
Senaga Kamejiro, Secretary General of the People’s Party totally denounced the Perry 
Centennial as nothing but the cultural propaganda designed by the U.S. military toward 
innocent Ryukyuans: 
 
Land acquisition and coercive evacuation are being enforced. They say that this is for the cause 
of freedom. However, I do not see why freedom should be safeguarded at the sacrifice of the living 
Ryukyuans . . . . Is it impossible to foster democracy without bulldozing potatoes and vegetables 
grown by farmers, without giving previous notice, without trading on rice which can be reaped only 
a month later, or without making human-head-sized watermelons victims of a bulldozer like 
fracturing human skull? (Daily Okinawan Press 1953, 25 May) 
 
Senaga called USCAR as the ruler which preventing the enactment of labor laws which 
safeguard the fundamental human rights of 100,000 workers in Ryukyu. He concluded that 
those things must be expelled from Ryukyu Islands. According to him, some people may 
require such amusements as firework display and other festivities, but such amusements are 
of no concern of 99% of the people of the Ryukyus. “Given freedom of life to everybody” 
this must be the basic principle of friendship (Daily Okinawan Press 1953, 25 May). 
Senaga’s harsh criticism toward USCAR followed what is called “Senaga affairs.” In 
1954, the Okinawans voted for socialist candidate Senaga Kamejiro for mayor. Immediately, 
then the USCAR cut their support for the Okinawan civic administration and tried to pass a 
non-confidence vote for him. As a result, the USCAR succeeded on depriving Senaga of his 
eligibility and the city council passed a non-confidence vote for him. Such USCAR’s 
pressure on the Okinawan civic administration brought about strong controversy not only 
among Okinawans but also in the international world itself (Watanabe, 1970:157-158). An 
article from Weekly Sankei called America’s conduct as equal to the assassination of Senaga, 
then strongly criticized contradictive U.S. “democratic” foreign policy:   
 
The United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands changed a requirement for non-
confidence in a mayor from to thirds to a majority of the full number of the assemblymen. Because 
the full number of assemblymen of Okinawa City is thirty and also because the number of Naha 
City Mayor Senega’s government control party is twelve, it was impossible to resolve non-
confidence in the mayor on the condition that these twelve government-controlled party assembly 
will not attend. This is because the number of pro-American not of the government party 
assemblymen was seventeen whereas more than twenty assemblymen in favor are required. If the 
United States desires to purge Mayor Senaga with whom it has found difficulty in dealing without 
resorting to such an illegal means like assassination, what it can do is to change the requirement for 
non-confidence from more than two thirds to a majority of the full number of the Assemblymen 
and if does so, it can surely and legally purge Mayor Senaga. This is because the numbers of pro-
American and non-governmental party assemblymen are seventeen which is two more than the 
majority number of fifteen (Takahashi, 1957, 15 December). 
              
The people in Okinawa responded to the purging of Mayor Senega and criticized U.S. 
military government. One of such voices stated: 




It is not impossible to imagine that the United States has taken the means as has been taken this 
time because of its fear that if the United States should have taken the first means, it would have 
been driven into a more disadvantageous situation than it would be now. If so, the case this time 
becomes a very queer example when the United States people explain the real nature of democracy 
which is always advocated by them. I cannot but worry about the benefit according to the great 
United States if this should be used as material for teaching what democracy is in Japanese primary 
and junior high schools. I believe that it will go more smoothly if the United States will abandon 
the administrative power. Furthermore, it is understandable from the Hungarian case that it’s 
impossible to oppress the real intention of the people forever” (Takahashi, 1957, 15 December).       
 
 
7. OKINAWA AS COLD WAR ISLAND 
 
In the late 1940s through the 1950s the advent of a Communist regime in Beijing and the 
outbreak of the Korean War changed the whole situation in East Asia. Japan’s international 
status shifted from former enemy to the trustworthy American ally to prevent Communist 
aggression in East Asia. The situation required the U.S. to make a fresh approach to the 
problem of Okinawa as well. The 1952 San Francisco Peace Treaty placed the islands under 
a United Nations trusteeship administrated by the United States, because American 
strategists agreed that its occupation of Okinawa was essential to prevent Japan’s revival as a 
hostile power. With the breakdown of the American-Soviet relationship, Okinawa emerged 
as the military linchpin of containment in the Asia-Pacific area. In the speech on American 
policy in Asia in January 1950, Secretary of State Dean Acheson regarded Okinawa as an 
important link in American defense line along the periphery of the Asia Continent (U.S. 
State Department Bulletin 1950, 23 January:115-118).  
The Okinawan bases played important roles in U.S. planning for the possible operations 
against the Soviet Union in Siberia, the Sea of Japan and the Sea of Okhotsk. They were vital 
for the implementation of United States policies toward China, the Korean Peninsula and the 
newly independent states of Southeast Asia. Therefore, the U.S. government invested $50 
million to build permanent military installation on Okinawa. The U.S. air force could hit a 
number of important targets in the Eurasian from airfields in the Ryukyus. American 
planners believed that medium bombers in Okinawa gave an effective advantage in that they 
could reach all important target areas within an arc including all of Southeast Asia, China, 
the Lake Baikal area, Eastern Siberia, and the southern tip of the Kamchatka Peninsula in the 
USSR. The U.S. bombers based in the Okinawa could also hit targets in the European region 
of the Soviet Union and land at air force bases in Western Europe. Okinawa also proved to 
be an important base during the Korean War. Three days after the North Korean army 
crossed into South Korea, the U.S. bombers stationed on the island began flying missions 
over the peninsula (Sarantakes, 2000:40-91). The New York Times wrote, “Okinawa is for 
the Air Force what Pearl Harbor is for the Navy” (New York Times, 1952, 21 September). 
By the 1960s, Okinawa had become the largest offensive nuclear base in East Asia. 
Especially after the outbreak of the Vietnam War, the island’s role as a strategic bomber base 
became increasingly vital.  
Another important reason for the U.S. retention of Okinawa was that U.S. policymakers 
had doubts about the dependability of the Japanese and worried that the Japanese might 
adopt a policy of neutrality during the Cold War, abandoning the struggle against 
communism. Some viewed Japan as an uncertain and unsure ally, and therefore, the United 
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States needed to keep its bases in Okinawa in case Japan should fail to support the U.S. 
policy in a moment of crisis. Due to these reasons mentioned above, despite the movement 
toward Okinawa’s reversion to Japan in the early 1950s, the United States strongly desired a 
long-term military installation on the island (FRUS 1985, XIV:1333-35).  
While the U.S. is obsessed with the threat of communism and ideology, how did 
Okinawans understand Cold War in Asia and Okinawa’s position? The Scientific 
Investigation of Ryukyu Islands (SIRI) report by anthropologist, Haring Douglas, 
investigated Okinawans understanding of communism and capitalism at that time and stated: 
           
What ideas do Amamians discuss? The range of their knowledge is limited by sketchy, meager 
news service. The outside world is psychologically remote, even though Amami fishermen 
occasionally glimpse Russian submarines. But their interests transcend the tidbits of news that 
trickle over the cables; topics commonly discussed include communism, democracy, science, 
movies, Amami traditions, capitalism vs. socialism and again communism. In general, their anti-
communist, but communism presents the one vivid idea that has burst into their world since the war. 
They can no more evade the topic than a New Yorker can ignore street traffic. . . Despite much 
discussion among Americans, both communism and capitalism continues to be understood vaguely 
and inaccurately. As long as [sic] communism continues its onward sweep in Asia, its ideology 
commands general interest and the issue cannot be avoided. Communism may be less prevalent in 
Amami Gunto than in Japan proper, but it is understood better than capitalism is understood; the 
latter is presented most ineffectively. . . The opposition to Communism on Amami Oshima, in my 
opinion is not the spontaneous fruit of belief in democracy and free enterprise; it is a combination 
of peasant indifference to politics and the persisting influence of the aristocratic-plutocratic 
minority that formerly dominated Amami society. Inept U.S. propaganda, abetted by America 
commercial movies, identifies democracy with material luxury and irresponsible license. . . [sic] In 
general democracy is presented in an alien tongue and appears to be something for rich America 
that could not work in poor Amami; Communist, however, comes from fellow villages in their own 
language, in the guise of an extension of familiar patterns of living (Haring, 1953).     
       
As the article shows, few Amamians had deep knowledge about the ideology of 
democracy and communism, and pro-American cultural orientation programs were not 
carrying influential message to the remote area of Ryukyu as the U.S. originally had assumed 
(Glacken, 1953). 
In contrast to the significance of Okinawa to Americans, growing popular discontent 
mushroomed among Okinawans over the U.S. authorities during the 1950s-960s as the 
island’s economy started recovering from the damages of the war. Okinawans tended to 
blame the United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands (USCAR) for various 
problems. The situation remained unchanged until 1952 when the Japanese Peace Treaty 
came into force. Meanwhile, there was a growing demand among the dispossessed 
landowners for compensation for their lands (Watanabe, 1970:36-37). Japanese newspaper 
loudly reported Okinawa problems. Thus, such organization as Zengakuren (student 
organization), Sohyo (Japanese Labor Union) and JCP (Japanese Communist Party) started 
supporting Okinawan reversion movement. Many Okinawan leaders regarded that 
reunification with Japan was the alternative to continuous American occupation. This was a 
severe blow to the Americans who were inclined to talk about the “show case for Western 
democracy” and Ryukyuan-American friendship on the occasion of Perry Centennial.  
 







In U.S. cultural propaganda campaign in Okinawa toward mid of the 1950s, U.S. military 
government had extreme optimism that democratization of the island would make 
Okinawans love America. They thought that if they introduce democracy, people in Okinawa 
would automatically follow U.S. policy. Why couldn’t the Americans be more sensitive over 
the issue of military bases, ownership of lands, Okinawa’s assertion of political autonomy, 
increasing hostility toward U.S. and eventually even their desire for the reversion to Japan? 
One reason was that the U.S. military was still heavily relied on the perception of Okinawans 
as the people whom they can easily influence. At the same time, Americans during the early 
Cold War had unquestionable faith in democracy and considered that spreading democracy 
in other parts of the world as part of America’s mission even if sometimes they needed to 
take undemocratic means to do so. Okinawans however, understood that America’s 
democratization of Okinawa was the secondary objectives, and it was just a means to justify 
the presence of U.S. military bases and U.S. foreign policy in Cold war Asia.  In Cocktail 
Party a novel by native Okinawan writer Oshiro Tatsuhiro (2011),  the main character whose 
daughter was raped by an American soldier in Okinawa stood in front of the flag, 
commemorating Perry’s anniversary with sentences “prosperity to Ryukuans and friendship 
for Ryukuans and Americans.” He then shouted that such friendship is faked, pretentious, 
and hypocritical. We must stop it. Then, he decided to take the American rapist to the court 
of law despite slim chances of win. Oshiro’s character represents majority of Okinawan’s 
opinion on America’s cultural propaganda and the Perry Centennial. With mass popularity, 
the literature won Akutagawa prize in 1967 and indicated Okinawa’s complex future relation 
with the United States at the turn of the century until the real case of Okinawan teenage girl 
who was raped by American soldier was brought to the court in 1995.  
The stationing of American troops in Okinawa had never enjoyed the majority support of 
the local people and became increasingly unpopular during the 1950s. A poll in 1957 asked, 
“The U.S.A. is about to withdraw all its troops from Japan except its air and naval forces. 
What do you think about it?” 66.3% of the public responded “Good” and only 15.95 said 
“Too soon.” This indicates that Ryukyuans did not worry about a Communist invasion and 
did not understand the need for foreign troops on their soil. Their discomfort about the 
existence of U.S. troops and military bases became a source of further difficulty in U.S.-
Okinawan relations when the Japanese mass media started exposing incidents of American 
GI’s involvement in murder, theft, and rape in U.S. military bases in Okinawa. When asked 
“Do Japanese think that their powerful American ally treats them as an `equal partner,' as 
proclaimed by Washington?” almost 50% of the people interviewed in 1956-1958 did not 
agree (Mendel, 1966:8). 
In 1952, the United States and Japan signed the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, which 
granted the U.S. the right to maintain bases and troops in Japan and  prohibited Japan from 
leasing military bases including the one in Okinawa to a third power without American 
consent, and gave the U.S. military the right to intervene in Japan’s domestic affairs. Many 
Japanese intellectuals scolded Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru and even Emperor Hirohito 
for an agreement that they claimed subordinated Japan’s independence to American interests, 
and the loss of Ryukyu Islands. When one takes into account such sentiment, it is hardly 
surprising that U.S. officials looked to the Perry Centennial Celebration to cement U.S.-
Okinawan friendship. For Okinawans in 1953, however, the memory of Perry’s arrival of 
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1853 paralleled Japan and Okinawa’s situation immediately following World War II. After 
experiencing the devastation of atomic weapons, the Japanese Emperor and Prime Minister 
had no choice but to accept any terms and reforms imposed by the U.S. Okinawa was under 
total occupation by the United States and was forced to provide military bases for America’s 
interest and national security in the Pacific against Communist aggression. As a result, Japan 
agreed to sign a “second unequal treaty,” the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. Though presented 
as a symbol of peaceful U.S.-Japan relations, many Ryukyuans viewed the Perry Centennial 
Celebration in terms of America’s political and military dominance over Okinawa.  
Ignorance of communism aggression, skepticism about materialized American society, 
and anti-American sentiment, all contributed to the unpopularity of the Perry Centennial 
particularly among Ryukyu intellectuals. Okinawa remained for 27 years as a symbol of the 
unequal status of Japan. Thus, the reversion of Okinawa signified the recognition by the 
United States of the rising status of Japan. The U.S. attempts to make Okinawa as a 
showcase of democracy through cultural propaganda campaign ended in 1972 when 
Okinawa was finally returned to mainland Japan under the Nixon-Sato communiqué.  
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